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Abstract   Following Russian intervention and a referendum held on 16th March 2014, the 
Ukrainian republic of Crimea became incorporated within Russia. The Crimean episode 
marked just the latest in a series of situations arising in former Soviet states in which 
secessionist movements within disaffected territorial units were able to advance their causes 
aided by Russian external intervention. These situations raise significant international legal 
issues pertaining to secession by component parts of existing states, underpinned by external 
intervention. The unwillingness of the international community to recognise Russia’s 
incorporation of Crimea, similar to its earlier rejection of the purported secession of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, reinforces the widely held view that non-consensual 
secession must be grounded in exceptional circumstances which were found to be lacking in 
all of these situations. It also reaffirms the principle that territorial changes brought about by 
external intervention will not be recognised. However, while legal assessments of these 
incidents may appear prima facie straightforward, they cannot be entirely divorced from the 
wider political phenomenon of ethnic conflict in former Soviet states and tensions existing in 
those states between factions seeking to further European integration and those prioritising 
strengthening relations with Russia. The international legal reasoning employed by the key 
protagonists must be understood with reference to this wider context. 
                                                          
 Dr Gary Wilson, Phd, LLB (Hons.), FHEA, Senior Lecturer in Law, Liverpool John Moores University. I am 
grateful to my colleagues Dr Nirmala Pillay and Dr Diana Sankey for reading and commenting upon earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
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Introduction 
On 16th March 2014, following tensions culminating in Russian intervention, a referendum 
was held within the Ukrainian republic of Crimea in which an overwhelming majority of 
those taking part purportedly voted in favour of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and 
integration within Russia. Two days later, the Kremlin proclaimed that Crimea was now part 
of Russia. By this point, Ukrainian authorities had effectively ceased to exercise any control 
over the territory, Russian military reinforcements in Crimea following its purported 
incorporation within the Russian Federation having ensured the departure of the remaining 
Ukrainian military contingents. These developments were roundly condemned by both 
Ukrainian authorities and large sections of the international community who regard Crimea’s 
purported secession as little more than a case of unlawful annexation by Russia. By contrast, 
Russia – and evidently a clear majority of the Crimean population – considers union with 
Russia a legitimate expression of the will of the inhabitants of Crimea, many of whom are 
ethnic Russians and enjoy a strong historic connection with Russia. 
Since Crimea’s incorporation within Russia, other pro-Russian separatist movements 
have gained strength in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, seizing control in those 
areas and holding so-called referenda in which those administering them claim overwhelming 
majorities in favour of independence from Ukraine (with some overtures towards possible 
ultimate union with Russia). The situations in these regions remain unresolved as they 
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continue to be beset by conflict between Ukrainian military forces and Russian-backed 
separatist groups. 
Russia’s intervention in Crimea and its purported secession from Ukraine cannot be 
considered in isolation, but must rather be understood in the context of a series of secessionist 
pressures within former Soviet republics where Russia has also intervened. It has been noted 
that, “Crimea followed on from South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the third in a trio of ‘similar 
cases’.”1 There are certainly some striking comparisons to be drawn with South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia,2 regions within Georgia which, supported by Russian intervention, have 
proclaimed their independence and currently operate as de facto states notwithstanding the 
almost universal refusal of the international community to recognise them. Reference to 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be relevant throughout the substantive treatment of issues 
concerning Crimea. 
The international legal issues raised by events in Crimea, as well as South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, are far from insignificant. This paper seeks to explore the issue of Crimea’s 
purported secession from Ukraine during 2014 against a backdrop of external intervention by 
Russia. We consider this event primarily with reference to the relevant international legal 
norms, but also within its geopolitical context. We begin by providing some historical context 
to events in Crimea; in light of the similarities between the cases, by way of background to 
understanding Russian claims made in respect of Crimea, we briefly outline the course of 
events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia leading to their de facto independence from Georgia. 
The development of Crimea’s status through the Soviet era to the present day is then detailed. 
Attention is then given to the concept of secession in international law and the relevant 
framework applicable to its exercise, before more specifically to the question of whether 
                                                          
1 Navari (2014: 1313). 
2 Navari (2014: 1314) notes that all three secessionist entities “claimed varying degrees of political suppression 
and subjection to the threat and use of violence”.  
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Crimea could stake an entitlement under international law to secede from Ukraine. We also 
consider Russia’s involvement in events, and the extent to which this is unlawful and 
effectively give rise to the annexation of Crimea. Finally, the geopolitical factors relevant to 
an understanding of the Crimean episode, and the manner in which these have informed the 
legal arguments employed by the key actors involved, are considered, as well as some of the 
inconsistencies in legal discourse which they highlight.  
 
Historical Background 
A note on South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
As has already been noted, the Crimean episode bears some resemblance to earlier 
developments within the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and reference to 
those developments will be helpful in providing some context to the more recent events in 
Crimea. South Ossetia is a semi-autonomous region within Georgia, the population of which 
is predominantly ethnically Ossetian, a group divided between South Ossetia in Georgia and 
North Ossetia in Russia. Ethnic Georgians comprise only a minority group within South 
Ossetia, albeit a sizeable one.3 The Ossetian people are of Iranian origin and enjoy a 
distinctive culture, language, and history of self-rule.4 South Ossetia had been under Russian 
rule during the nineteenth century,5 and although always part of Georgia during the Soviet era, 
the population of South Ossetia have a long history of good relations with Russia,6it being 
home to the larger share of the ethnic Ossetian population within the region. In the post-Cold 
War era tensions between South Ossetia and Georgia have always been present. Surveys have 
                                                          
3 Approximately 20-30 per cent at the time of the outbreak of the August 2008 war. See Toomey (2009: 445-
449). 
4 See the BBC profile for South Ossetia, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18269210 >. See also Higgins & 
O’Reilly (2009: 580). 
5 See NuBberger (2009:351).  
6 See Toomey (2009: 445-449). 
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revealed significant levels of mutual distrust between Georgians and South Ossetians,7 and 
following conflict between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in the early 1990s, a Russian 
led peacekeeping presence was deployed to South Ossetia.8 On a number of occasions South 
Ossetia sought to advance the cause of independence. Having declared its sovereignty in 
1990, in a 1992 referendum its population backed independence and from that point South 
Ossetia effectively functioned de facto independently of Georgian authority, reiterating its 
independence again on further occasions.9  
Tensions heightened following Georgian President Saakashvili’s push to reassert 
Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia,10 leading to a full-blown war between Georgian 
and Russian/South Ossetian forces during August 2008.11 Both sides traded blame for the 
violence,12 which ended after five days. South Ossetia’s declaration of independence at this 
time was recognised by Russia,13 although heavily condemned by the international 
community at large which still regards it as de jure part of Georgia.14 
Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia is a semi-autonomous region within Georgia which has 
experienced tensions with its parent state.15 For a long time Abkhazia was an independent 
territory, before becoming subsumed within first the Osman empire, then from 1810 onwards 
the Russian empire. Within the Soviet Union, it was initially a separate republic until its 
integration within Georgia by decree of Stalin in 1931. The Abkhaz people have little in 
common with either Russia or Georgia, enjoying a distinct culture and language, and being 
                                                          
7 Higgins & O’Reilly (2009: 568-570). 
8 See Petro (2008: 1528-1533). 
9 For example, in a 2006 referendum, 95 per cent purportedly backed independence. See, eg., ‘South Ossetians 
vote for independence’, The Guardian, 13 November 2006 
<www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/13/russia.georgia>. 
10 See Chatham (2011: 77-78). 
11 For brief details, see Toomey (2009: 450-452). 
12 See Musselman (2010: 322-324); NuBberger (2009: 345-346). 
13 See Higgins & O’Reilly (2009: 571-573). 
14 See Musselman (2010: 325-329). 
15 See the BBC profile for Abkhazia, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18175030> . 
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adherents of Islam.16 As the USSR began to dissolve, tensions increased and Abkhazia 
asserted its independence, conflict breaking out with Georgia in 1992. A Russian brokered 
agreement restored peace in 1994,17 although like South Ossetia, Abkhazia has effectively 
operated as a de facto independent state since. Its status was strengthened in 2008 when 
conflict in South Ossetia spread to Abkhazia, and Russia recognised Abkhazian independence 
at the same time that it extended recognition to South Ossetia. 
 
Crimea 
The area comprising present day Crimea has been controlled by various groups throughout its 
history.18 For centuries predominantly populated by Crimean Tatars,19 it came under full 
Russian control in the late eighteenth century.20 Crimea remained part of Russia into the 
Soviet era until it was transferred to the Ukraine in 1954.21 While the population remained 
largely Russian, the 1954 transition was mainly symbolic given that both Russia and Ukraine 
belonged to the same sovereign state, the USSR. While Ukraine remained relatively peaceful 
as early post-Cold War secessionist conflicts flared up in other ex-Soviet states, including 
Georgia,22 Crimea was nonetheless identified as one potential source of tension at that time, 
one observer noting that, “The Crimea has been specifically referred to as, ‘one of the most 
sensitive regions in South-Eastern Europe’”, adding that “there is fear that it will turn into yet 
                                                          
16 See Davies (1997: 816). 
17 See NuBberger (2009: 361-2). 
18 Wydra (2004: 112). 
19 See Magosi (1996: 172-178). 
20 See Wydra (2004: 112). 
21 See Magosi (1996: 653). 
22 On some of these post-Soviet secessionist conflicts, see, eg., Gaweda & Siddi (2012); Sterio (2013: 130-160) 
(on Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia). 
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another ‘hot spot’ in the growing list of ethnic conflicts throughout Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.”23  
A key factor in the secessionist threat within Crimea has undoubtedly been the 
existence of a sizeable ethnic Russian population.24 In the early years of Ukrainian 
independence post-Cold War, concessions were made to Crimea in respect of political, 
cultural and economic autonomy,25 although relative stability prevailed until the events of 
early 2014. These events have to be understood against the backdrop of East-West tensions in 
Ukraine. Since the dissolution of the USSR, the country has experienced tensions between its 
broadly pro-European western regions which demonstrate greater support for Ukraine’s 
attempt to attain membership of the European Union and move the country towards 
integration within European political structures, such as NATO, and its broadly pro-Russian 
eastern regions which favour the retention of close relations with Russia.26 
The so-called ‘Euromaidan’ movement began in November 2013 with protests against 
the government of President Viktor Yanyukovych, after he reneged on plans to sign a 
comprehensive trade agreement with the European Union.27 Beginning as peaceful protests, 
the uprisings in the capital, Kiev, intensified in February 2014 and culminated in Parliament’s 
impeachment of President Yanyukovych, his departure from the country, and the installation 
of an interim government pending new elections.28 In late February, in response to these 
developments, seen as designed to reassert efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s relations with the 
                                                          
23 Chase (1996: 220). 
24 According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, ethnic Russians accounted for 58 per cent of the population of 
Crimea  <2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ >. See also Bugajski (2000: 173-175). 
25 See Chase (1996: 223); Wydra (2004: 121-129). See also Sasse (2002). 
26 See, eg., White, McAlister & Feklyunina (2010). On ethnic and national identity more generally within post-
Soviet Ukraine, see Liber (1998); Nemyria (1999). 
27 ‘Ukraine rally over EU agreement delay’, BBC News Online, 25 November 2013 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25083801 >.  
28 See ‘Ukrainian MPs vote to oust President Yanyukovych’, BBC News Online, 24 February 2014 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26304842 >. On the sequence of events leading up to Crimea’s 
incorporation within Russia, see Smith & Harari (2014: 1). In new presidential elections held on 25 May 2014, 
Petro Poroshenko was elected as Ukraine’s President. 
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EU, pro-Russian armed groups occupied and took control of Crimea. On 6th March Crimea’s 
Parliament approved the holding of a referendum which would give citizens the option of 
union with Russia or enhanced autonomy.29 In that referendum, a reported 96 per cent backed 
union with Russia,30 and two days later the Kremlin proclaimed Crimea part of Russia, 
President Putin placing much emphasis upon their historic links.31 The Kiev government, the 
EU, US and other major international actors regarded the action as unlawful,32 and Russia 
was suspended from the G8.33 UN Security Council condemnation of the action was only 
prevented by Russia’s exercise of its power of veto,34 while the UN General Assembly (by a 
vote of 100 to 11 with 58 abstentions) called upon states not to recognize any change in 
Crimea’s status.35 Factually, the incorporation of Crimea within Russia is a fait accompli, 
although it also sparked off a wave of secessionist pressures within Eastern Ukraine as large 
swathes of areas with large ethnic Russian populations, Donetsk and Luhansk, fell under the 
control of armed separatist groups sympathetic to Russia.36 These areas have subsequently 
held referendums on their future status,37 which remains unresolved amidst continued armed 
conflict. 
 
                                                          
29 See Shuster (2014: 20-25). 
30 ‘Crimea referendum: Voters ‘back Russia union’, BBC News Online, 16 March 2014 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26606097 >. 
31 Putin stated that, “Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride…In people’s hearts and 
minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia.” See President Putin’s Speech of 18 March 2014, 
available at the Kremlin website, <eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 >.  
32 See, eg., ‘Ukraine Crisis: Russia isolated in UN Crimea vote’, BBC News Online, 15 March 2014 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26595776>.  
33 See ‘G8 suspends Russia for annexation of Crimea’, The Telegraph, 24 March 2014 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-
Crimea.html >.  
34 UN Doc. S/2014/189; UN Doc. S/PV.7138. 13 members of the Council backed the condemnatory resolution, 
China abstaining. 
35 GA Res 68/262. See also UN Doc. GA/11493. 
36 See, eg., ‘Pro-Russian rebels vow to take control of infrastructure across Donetsk region’, The Guardian, 14 
April 2014 <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/ukraine-deadline-pro-russian-rebels-passes >.  
37 ‘Ukraine rebels hold referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk’, BBC News Online, 11 May 2014 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27360146 >. 
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The Case for Secession or Irredentism 
Secession has been defined as “the effort of a group or section of a state to withdraw itself 
from the political or constitutional authority of that state.”38 There has been a tendency to 
apply the term “secession” to those instances in which territorial entities break away from 
their parent state and assert their independent statehood.39 Where a territorial entity breaks 
away from its parent state in order to join another state – usually with which it shares ethnic, 
national, religious or linguistic characteristics and/or a strong historical connection – that 
process is generally considered an instance of irredentism. That Crimea has purported to form 
a union with Russia – unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have declared their own 
independent statehood – might suggest that the latter term is more suited to its treatment 
within the present discussion. However, it is contended that framing consideration of the 
Crimean episode within the parameters of discourse on secession is appropriate for two 
principal reasons. First, “secession” implies a breaking off from an existing territorial 
relationship. While it may result in independence, it can also serve as a precursor to union 
with another state. Indeed, some international lawyers have defined secession to encompass 
such an outcome.40 The legal principles which govern secession are therefore equally 
applicable to processes resulting in entities breaking away from one state and joining another. 
Second, there has been very little treatment of irredentism as a separate legal concept,41 
probably owing largely to the fact that there have been so few situations in which a territorial 
unit seeks union with another state as opposed to outright independence. 
There is a considerable degree of consensus that while international law does not 
explicitly prohibit secession by entities within existing states, nor does it provide any general 
                                                          
38 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 SCR [1998] 217, at para.83. 
39 See, eg., above, where the decision goes on to define secession as a process directed towards the 
achievement of independent statehood on the part of the seceding entity.  
40 See, eg., Dugard & Raic (2006: 101-102). 
41 For discussion, however, in the context of Somalia, Germany and Cyprus, see Musgrave (1997: 211-229). 
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right of secession.42 Where secession takes place with the consent of the state which is losing 
a part of its territory– as for example occurred when South Sudan seceded from Sudan43 – 
there is no great difficulty in legal terms. However, where secession is attempted against the 
will of the parent state it becomes necessary from a perspective of legitimacy to base this in 
some normative legal principles, not least in order to generate international recognition of the 
new arrangements. The limited international recognition of Crimea’s absorption within 
Russia, 44 and of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence,45 suggests that the legal basis for 
these actions is considered lacking. 
States have approached non-consensual secession cautiously.46 As Jaber has noted, 
“although states have consistently upheld the right to secession where it is the product of a 
consensual arrangement with the state, they have generally not accepted unilateral secessions 
that violate the territorial integrity of independent states.”47 Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the “historical criteria for international recognition of claims of secession 
include the approval of the state from which the entity in question is seceding, the degree of 
repression within the larger state, historical claims of independence, the extent to which the 
seceding region has exhausted possibilities of a negotiated settlement of its disputes, the 
ability of the new state to maintain internal order and defend its borders, and the extent to 
which secession would be destabilizing.”48The case of Bangladesh appears to have been the 
only instance in which a seceding entity has been given the legitimation of international 
                                                          
42 See, eg., Quebec decision, paras.111-112. 
43 For discussion, see Sheeran (2011); Vidmar (2011-12).  
44 As of April 2014, Crimea had only been recognised as part of Russia by Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, North 
Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. 
45 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only recognised as independent states by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and 
Nauru. 
46 See Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 13-16); Crawford (2006: 388-391). 
47 Jaber (2011: 934). See also Crawford (1998). Orakhelashvili (2008: 1) notes that even in the early post-Cold 
War era, where 21 new states rapidly came into existence, the principle that no entity may secede without the 
consent of its parent state retained validity. 
48 Chase (1996: 232). 
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recognition against the will of the parent state,49 although a more recent precedent might be 
found in respect of the large number of states to have recognized Kosovo.50  
From the standpoint of international law, the starting point from which attempts to 
identify norms which might legitimate acts of secession might be made has usually been the 
principle of self-determination.51 Indeed, Russia sought to legitimise Crimea’s secession from 
Ukraine by reference to the principle of external self-determination.52 Whereas the principle’s 
‘internal’ dimension effectively refers to the right of a state’s population to determine their 
own political system and form of government,53 ‘external’ self-determination concerns the 
process by which a territorial unit removes itself from the sovereign authority of its parent 
state, whether by seceding to form a newly independent state or through union with another 
state. Although its philosophical and political origins can be traced much earlier,54 self-
determination as a legal principle was developed through a series of UN General Assembly 
resolutions.55 It was at least initially conceived as a principle applicable to the decolonisation 
process in the post-World War Two period,56 and has been recognised by the ICJ as “one of 
the essential principles of contemporary international law.”57 The initial focus on 
decolonisation was evident in the language of General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541, 
the former being proclaimed a “declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 
                                                          
49 For discussion, see Buchheit (1978: 198-214); Meadwell (1999); Jaber (2011: 939-40);  Nanda (1980).  
50 108 UN Member States had recognised Kosovo as of 15th April 2014. For references to their various 
declarations of recognition, see <www.kosovothanksyou.com/>. The literature on Kosovo is voluminous. The 
more detailed treatments include Orakhelashvili (2008); Koeck, Horn & Leidenmuehler (2009); Weller (2009); 
Summers (2011). 
51 The long history of the idea of self-determination is beyond our present scope. For an overview, see 
Summers (2007: 83). 
52 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV.7144, at 8; UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, at 3, for Russian statements to this effect. These are 
detailed in Christakis (2015).  
53 On the nature of internal self-determination, see Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 16-20); Summers (2013); 
Quebec decision, paras.17, 33-39. 
54 See Musgrave (1997: 15-31); Summers (2007). 
55 See GA Res. 1514 (1960); GA Res 1541 (1960); GA Res 2625 (1970). 
56 See, eg., Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 20-25); Cassese (1995: ch3); Crawford (2006: 107-131).  
57 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 91, at para.29. For further discussion of self-determination’s 
consideration by the ICJ, see Musgrave (1997: 77-90). 
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countries and peoples” and requiring immediate steps to confer independence on trust and 
non-self governing territories.58 Clearly, any right to self-determination restricted to colonial 
peoples would be of no relevance to the populations of Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia as 
they do not constitute colonial entities. However, although some scholars consider self-
determination to have no application outside of the colonial context,59 there is a considerable 
degree of support for its relevance in a wider context. Such an understanding of its scope is 
largely based upon an interpretation of the so-called ‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations 
declaration of the UN General Assembly, which provides that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.’60   
While beginning with a presumption against the dismemberment or impairment of the 
territory of an existing state, the latter part of the provision has been taken to suggest that 
where a state in a non-colonial setting does not afford equal protection or representation to all 
of its citizens, then in certain defined circumstances a sufficiently disadvantaged group within 
that state may have a right of ‘remedial’ secession. Effectively, because it has been unable to 
exercise a right of internal self-determination through adequate participation and 
representation within the state’s political structures, the right to self-determination can only 
be exercised externally through an act of “divorce” from the state; secession. While there is 
                                                          
58 Para.5. Resolution1541 defined with greater clarity the obligations imposed by resolution 1514. 
59 See, eg., Buchheit (1978: 87), who argues that “The history of United Nations practice lends substantial 
support to the thesis that the principle of self-determination…is primarily a vehicle for decolonization, not an 
authorization of secession.” 
60 GA Res. 2625 (1970). 
13 
 
some support for such a view,61 there is no clear consensus upon this matter,62 although it is 
suggested that support for ‘remedial secession’ has grown in recent times.63 Without clearly 
defined criteria, there is obviously a danger that acknowledging a right to secede opens the 
door to a broad range of claims from various dissatisfied minority groupings. The main areas 
of debate concern the form of action on the part of the parent state which will give rise to a 
right of secession for an oppressed group, and who constitutes a ‘people’ capable of 
exercising such a right. 
While self-determination is stated within the various instruments to be a right of 
“peoples”, there is no universal definition as to who constitutes a “people” for such purposes. 
Resolution 2625 itself makes reference to “race, creed, or colour” as characteristics of a 
people, and those attempts that have been made to define the term “peoples” for self-
determination purposes have tended to make reference to a group’s shared ethnicity, language, 
religion, historical tradition, culture or territorial connection.64 A UNESCO definition set out 
seven shared characteristics of a people, including a common historical tradition, racial or 
ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, and religious or ideological affinity.65 
Similar criteria were outlined by the International Commission of Jurists in the context of 
Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan.66 It is further suggested that to qualify as a “people” a 
group should satisfy both objective and subjective elements: that it objectively shares a 
                                                          
61 See, eg., Quebec decision, paras. 111-139. The content of the ‘saving clause’ was also reiterated by the 
Vienna Declaration of 1993. See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para.2. 
62 For a critique of the doctrine of remedial secession, see Del Mar (2013: 79). See also Hilpold (2009: 55).  
63 Weller (2008: 59). 
64 See, eg., McCorquodale (1994: 866); Knop (2002). 
65 International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, convened by 
UNESCO, Paris 27-30 November 1989, SHS 89/CONF.602/7, para. 23. The other characteristics listed were 
territorial connection and common economic life. 
66 Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists (1972: 70). 
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number of the characteristics mentioned above, and that it subjectively considers itself to be a 
people.67 
Categorizing the population of Crimea as a “people” in accordance with such criteria 
is problematic. While Ethnic Russians comprise a clear majority of the territory’s population 
according to the most recent census (58 per cent), Ukrainians and Tatars comprise sizeable 
proportions also (24 per cent and 12 per centrespectively),68 and it is difficult to speak of any 
single homogenous group of people which overwhelmingly represents the identity of Crimea. 
It could be said that more than one “people” inhabit Crimea. There are significant divisions in 
terms of national identity and language. Any purported assertion of a right to external self-
determination is also being largely advanced by the Ethnic Russian population, which cannot 
alone represent the population of Crimea at large.69 This is in marked contrast to, say, the 
situation in Kosovo where Kosovar Albanians accounted for 90 per cent of the province’s 
population at the time of its declaration of independence from Serbia. That 96 per cent of 
those voting in the March 16th referendum purportedly backed secession from the Ukraine is 
of little consequence given doubts over the reliability of the poll, disputes over the actual 
turnout and that those groups opposed to secession seem to have boycotted the referendum in 
large numbers.70 Similar difficulties apply to attempts to categorise the populations of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “peoples” for the purposes of assessing their earlier attempts 
to secede from Georgia. Until relatively recently, ethnic Georgians were the largest single 
population group in Abkhazia,71 and while their numbers have declined considerably since 
the outbreak of conflict, ethnic Abkhazs only account for just over half of the territory’s 
                                                          
67 Sterio (2013: 16-18). 
68 2001 Ukrainian Census. 
69 The issue of determining the existence of a ‘people’ for self-determination purposes is even more 
problematic in the cases of Donetsk and Luhansk, where ethnic Russians account for a minority of the 
population as a whole, and the ethnic Ukrainian share of the population is considerably larger than in Crimea.  
70 See, eg., ‘Crimea’s referendum was a sham display of democracy’, The Guardian, 17 March 2014 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/17/crimea-referendum-sham-display-democracy-ukraine>.  
71 According to 1989 census figures, available on the Government of Abkhazia website, 
<abkhazia.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=42 >.  
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population, Georgians forming the second largest group, and Armenians the third.72 Although 
larger, the ethnic Ossetian population of South Ossetia only accounted for an estimated 67 
per cent of the territory’s population at the time of its purported secession in 2008, ethnic 
Georgians still then representing a sizeable 25 per cent of the overall population.73 
Notwithstanding serious doubts over whether there existed ‘peoples’ capable of 
exercising a right of secession in the cases of Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is 
unlikely that the circumstances necessary for any such right to have become exercisable had 
arisen. Any right to remedial secession generally arises only in extreme circumstances. A 
group exercising it must be able to point to severe instances of human rights abuses or acts of 
oppression directed against them by state authorities.74 Cassese argues that secession might 
be warranted where, “[T]he central authorities of a sovereign state persistently refuse to grant 
participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon 
their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement…there 
must be gross breaches of fundamental  human rights.”75 Similarly, Weller suggests that a 
right of remedial secession will arise “where the central government persistently and 
systematically represses a territorially organised, and perhaps also constitutionally recognised, 
segment of the population…” or subjects that group to “persistent and discriminatory 
exclusion from governance.”76 In the Quebec case, the Canadian Supreme Court envisaged a 
possible right of secession in circumstances where a group is “subject to alien subjugation, 
domination or exploitation.”77 It is very difficult to establish the existence of such 
circumstances in respect of the treatment of Crimea’s population by Ukrainian authorities, or 
                                                          
72 According to the 2011 Abkhazian census. See <unpo.org/members/7854 >. 
73 See, eg., Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use, Georgia: a toponymic note 
concerning South Ossetia <www.pcgn.org.uk/Georgia%20-%20South%20Ossetia-Jan07.pdf>. 
74 See, eg., Cassese (1995: 119-120); Ryngaert & Griffisen (2009: 575-576); Jaber (2011: 934-940). 
75 Cassese (1995: 119-120). See also Knop (2002: 74). 
76 Weller (2008: 59). 
77 Quebec decision, paras.113-114. 
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Georgia’s treatment of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz populations. 78 Certainly any parallels 
with Kosovo are far-fetched. 
Although there have been claims of violence directed against ethnic Russians within 
Ukraine and legitimate fears over the safety of Russian groups as a result of a surge in 
Ukrainian nationalism which underpinned the removal of the official status enjoyed by 
minority languages in Ukraine,79 it is difficult to place this on any comparable plane to those 
events which took place in Kosovo during the late 1990s.80 Notwithstanding President Putin’s 
invocation of pressures placed upon Russians and the “Kosovo precedent”,81 as one 
commentator has noted “comparison [of Kosovo] with Crimea is strained. Kiev’s rule is not 
as brutal as Belgrade’s.”82 
Furthermore, the western response to events in Kosovo during 1999 – when NATO 
conducted military strikes against Serbian targets – was concerned solely with the alleviation 
of humanitarian suffering.83 In sharp contrast, Russian intervention in the Ukraine furthered 
the objective of the acquisition of Crimea, undermining any apparently humanitarian 
objective. Russia’s own treatment of sections of the Crimean population has also been 
heavily criticised on human rights grounds.84 
 
Intervention leading to Secession and Annexation 
                                                          
78 See, eg., NuBberger (2009: 355-358); Sterio (2013: 149-152). 
79 See Quigley (2014). 
80 On atrocities in Kosovo, see, eg., O’Neill (2002: 21-35); Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
(2000: 33-83).  For comparison of Crimea and Kosovo, see Malyarenko & Galbraith (2013). 
81 Speech of 18 March 2014. 
82 Chesterman (2014: 2). See also Smith & Harari (2014: 26); Malyarenko & Galbraith (2013: 918). 
83 Although, for speculation as to ulterior motives on the part of intervening states, see Pinter (2000); Ali 
(2000). Significantly, Kosovo’s purported secession from Serbia came several years later and took the form of a 
proclamation of independent statehood. 
84 See Human Rights Watch (2014). 
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Although any right of secession in international law arises only in narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances, at the same time there is no prohibition upon acts of secession as such. This 
much was confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion upon the legality of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence.85 Where secession arises in opposition to the will of the parent 
state, the response of the international community is central to legitimising or condemning 
the resulting state of affairs. Secession, or irredentism, is all the more controversial where it 
takes place against a backdrop of external intervention, as this serves to undermine what may 
otherwise be considered a lawful action. There is considerable support in international law for 
the principle that states are obliged to withhold recognition from territorial changes which are 
brought about by breaches of international legal norms, the so-called doctrine of collective 
non-recognition.86 This point was arguably made clear in the ICJ’s advisory opinion in the 
Kosovo case, where in relation to declarations of independence it noted that, “Illegality 
attached to [some other] declarations of independence…stemmed not from the unilateral 
character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, 
connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of peremptory character (jus cogens).”87   
This view is reinforced by the international response to Northern Cyprus’ purported 
secession from Cyprus in a case bearing some striking similarities to that of Crimea. 
Following intervention by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot population in the north of the island 
were able to separate from the Greek dominated south,88 in a manner akin to Crimea’s 
secession from Ukraine following Russian intervention. Significantly, however, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus has not been afforded recognition by any state other than 
                                                          
85 Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, ICJ Rep 
2010, 141. 
86 See Orakhelashvili (2008: 25-31); Vidmar (2009: 827-849); Caspersen (2012: 28-30). 
87 Kosovo opinion, para.81. See also Article 41, ILC Articles on State Responsibility 2001. 
88 On the case for remedial secession on the part of Turkish Cypriots, see Tocci (2003: 79-84); Raic (2012: 124-
127). 
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Turkey.89 The UN Security Council declared Northern Cyprus’ declaration of independence 
to be legally invalid and called upon states to withhold recognition.90 Northern Cyprus’ 
purported secession was also implicitly condemned by the UN General Assembly.91 Where 
territory is regarded as having been annexed by an intervening state, the international 
community has consistently condemned such developments.92 The only obvious example of a 
situation in which recognition was extended to a change to the territorial status quo aided by 
external intervention is that of Bangladesh, where the secession of East Pakistan to form a 
new state was facilitated in large part by India’s military intervention.93 However, this is 
hardly a comparable situation to that of Crimea or Georgia’s secessionist entities, the 
catalogue of atrocities perpetrated against the population of East Pakistan by the authorities 
of its parent state being well documented.94 
While the result of the Crimean referendum on the option of union with Russia may 
well represent a reliable and authoritative expression of the wishes of a majority of that 
territory’s population, especially given that a majority of the population were ethnic Russians, 
it took place against the will of the parent state, Ukraine. What is more, it was arguably only 
possible as a result of the role played by Russia, an external actor. As Ukraine itself noted, 
“The declaration of independence by the Crimean Republic is a direct consequence of the 
application of the use of force and threats against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.”95 
Without this it is inconceivable that any referendum or resulting territorial realignment of the 
territory would have been possible. As Allison notes, “The core issue is that Russia created 
an illegal territorial situation by using the threat of force,” the referendum having taken place 
                                                          
89 See Ronen (1979: 61-70). 
90 SC Res 541 (1983). 
91 GA Res 253 (XXXVII) (1983). 
92 For example, Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was condemned by the Security Council (SC Res 662 (1990)), as 
was Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem (SC Res 267 (1969)). 
93 See Buchheit (1978: 198-214); Castellino (2000: 147-172). 
94 See Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists report (1972). 
95 UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 6. 
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“in the intimidating presence of Russian troops.”96 Russia’s role in Crimea’s affairs mirrors to 
some extent its earlier involvement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which enjoy de 
facto ‘independence’ from Georgia in no small part due to the role played by Russia in their 
affairs. Both secessionist campaigns were aided by Russian military intervention, which was 
particularly decisive in the 2008 conflict.97 If Crimea’s incorporation within Russia is the 
result of actions that constitute violations of international law, the international community’s 
sweeping denunciation and rejection of it is appropriate.98  
The territorial integrity of sovereign states within Europe is guaranteed by the 
Helsinki Final Act.99  More significantly, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter protects the 
territorial integrity and political independence of states against the use of force applied by 
other states. In respect of Crimea, serious issues of international law arise concerning 
Russia’s intervention within Ukraine insofar as this may constitute a violation of Article 2 (4), 
as well as other norms which safeguard states’ territory against external intervention.100 
Russia was also obliged to respect Ukraine’s existing borders under the terms of bilateral 
agreements between the two states.101 
Where the armed forces of one state cross the borders of another state, there is a clear 
prima facie instance of unlawful intervention involving the use of force contrary to Article 2 
(4). Initially Russia denied having despatched forces to Crimea prior to its referendum on 
union with Russia, but later admitted that Russian forces had entered the province.102 
                                                          
96 Allison  (2014: 1266)  
97 See NuBberger (2013: paras.26-30). 
98 A view heavily supported by many states. For discussion, see Corten (2015: 35-38). 
99 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act 1975, Pt.I (a) (iv). See also Pt.I (a) (i)-(iii) on 
sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, and inviolability of frontiers. 
100 For example, the doctrine of non-intervention. See GA Res. 2131 (XX); GA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
101 See Budapest Memorandum, 5 December 1994, paras.1-2; Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Partnership 1997, Article 3. See further Marxsen (2014). 
102 See ‘Putin’s remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine’, The Washington Post, 17 April 2014 
<www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-
vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html >.  
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Although the extent to which Russia used force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the Ukraine may be debated, that it intervened in Crimea and was 
responsible for the application of coercive measures is largely undisputed.103 In any event it 
might also be noted that violations of Article 2 (4) can take more subtle forms. In the 
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice noted that a state could be held responsible 
for the armed activities of third party actors where these perform acts under its “effective 
control”.104 In making this point, the ICJ relied on the UN General Assembly’s earlier 
Definition of Aggression,105 which acknowledged that acts of aggression by states could 
include their sending of irregular forces.106 The onus is therefore on Russia to provide legal 
justification for intervention which negates a prima facie violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter. Three principal possible justifications seem to have been hinted at in official Russian 
rhetoric: counter-coup, invitation, and humanitarian intervention/protection of nationals. 
These echoed Russian claims advanced at the time of its earlier interventions in support of 
the secessionist regions within Georgia,107although from some perspectives they “stretched 
legal credibility even further.”108 
The Ukrainian Parliament’s impeachment and removal of President Yanyukovych 
was attacked by Russia as a western backed, illegal coup.109 Although the fact that nearly 
three quarters of Ukrainian MPs voted to impeach him would appear to have afforded some 
                                                          
103 See UN Doc. S/PV. 7124, 1 March 2014, 2-3 (comments of Deputy UN Secretary-General and Ukrainian 
representative). 
104 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Merits), ICJ Rep, 1986, para.115. 
105 Nicaragua case, para.195. UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX). 
106 See Wilson (2012: 183). See also Gray (2004: 108-120). 
107 Russia’s justifications for action taken in respect of South Ossetia and Abkhazia broadly revolved around 
self-defence, fulfilment of peacekeeping functions, and the protection of civilians. See NuBberger (2013: 
para.29); Petro (2008: 1528-1537); Toomey (2009: 464-5). A controversial aspect of Russia’s purported 
justifications was to claim protection of Russian nationals in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, these being 
essentially Georgian nationals it had dubiously conferred Russian citizenship upon in order to be able to claim 
an interest in their treatment. See further Petro (2008: 1534); Higgins & O’Reilly (2009: 582); Toomey (2009: 
475-6); Chatham (2011: 93-95). 
108 Allison (2014: 1260). 
109 See Speech by President Putin of 18 March 2014. See also UN Doc. S/PV.7134, at 15. 
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democratic legitimacy for the change of government in Kiev, strictly speaking the terms of 
the Ukrainian constitution set a higher standard which must be satisfied for impeachment to 
proceed.110 However, this is internationally irrelevant. Irrespective of the merits of this course 
of action, this is a domestic and not an international matter. It does not provide any legal 
authority for external intervention. However, its relevance must be seen in the context of the 
two principal justifications alluded to by Russia. 
Russia claimed to have received an invitation from the ousted President Yanyukovch 
to intervene.111 State authorities may invite foreign forces onto their territories to assist in 
responding to crisis or conflict situations,112 but who exactly is entitled to issue this invitation 
depends upon which of two approaches are adopted in respect of the identification of the 
state’s government: the ‘effective control’ and ‘popular sovereignty’ models. The former 
attaches significance to a government’s exercise of effective control within the state, whereas 
the latter looks to its democratic legitimacy.113 International law appears to have provided no 
consistent practice upon the approach to be taken,114although there is some evidence that the 
latter has gained in support in recent years.115 Nonetheless, neither is particularly helpful to 
Russia’s argument. Yanyukovych had lost effective control within the Ukraine. Applying the 
‘effective control’ theory of authority, this meant he had no power to issue such an invitation. 
While the alternative ‘popular sovereignty’ theory holds that a deposed leader or regime 
endowed with democratic legitimacy may still be treated as the legitimate authority within 
                                                          
110 Article 111 sets out a series of procedures to be followed for a president to be removed following 
impeachment, which do not appear to have been followed. Furthermore, the decision to remove Yanyukovych 
did not quite receive the three quarters majority specified by Article 111. 
111 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV. 7124, above n91, 5. See further Allison (2014: 1264-5). 
112 Note, for example, the UN Security Council’s welcoming of the French intervention in Mali at the request of 
its government: SC Res. 2100 (2013). See also the judgment of the ICJ in Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (DRC v Uganda), ICJ Rep, 2005, 168. 
113 See Roth (1999: 136-149). 
114 See Gray (2004: 83-87). 
115 See, eg., Marxsen (2014: 374-380), for consideration of possible cases in which invitations emanating from 
democratically elected governments lacking effective control have resulted in intervention. 
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the state, the scale of support for Yanyukovych’s impeachment would suggest that the 
legitimacy conferred by popular sovereignty now resided with the new regime in Kiev.  
Although not explicitly invoking the controversial doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, Russia nonetheless referred to the need to protect Russian citizens within the 
Ukraine,116 an argument advanced at the time of its equally controversial incursion into the 
Georgian province of South Ossetia during 2008.117 While the existence of a right of 
humanitarian intervention is doubtful in itself,118 even those who advocate the existence of 
such a right set the threshold at which circumstances will entitle its exercise at a much greater 
level of severity than that seen in the treatment of the Russian population of Crimea.119 The 
legality of intervention for the narrower objective of protecting nationals is also disputed.120 
Furthermore, Russia’s policy of conferring nationality on large numbers of inhabitants of 
Crimea cast into doubt the validity of its claims in this regard. This approach was reminiscent 
of its actions in the earlier South Ossetian incident, where “the widespread distribution of 
Russian passports, especially to Ossetian residents, meant that Russia was able to 
‘manufacture’ a population of nationals in Georgia that it claimed to be defending.”121 The 
better view within international law is that nationality claimed must be ‘real and effective’.122 
                                                          
116 See, eg., Putin speech of 18 March. 
117 See Petro (2008: 1525-1533); Musselman (2010: 329-336). 
118 The literature which the topic has generated is voluminous. See, eg., Chesterman (2001); Wheeler (2002); 
Teson (2005). 
119 See, eg., Cassese (1999: 27) who advocates that the requirements for humanitarian intervention should 
include include “gross and egregious breaches of human rights involving loss of life of hundreds or thousands 
of innocent people, and amounting to crimes against humanity…”, action to halt such atrocities being taken by 
a group of states, with support or non-opposition of a majority of UN member states, and the use of armed 
force being limited to halting the atrocities. None of these criteria were present in respect of any Russian 
intervention in Crimea. 
120 See, eg., Franck (2002: 76-96); Gray (2004: 126-129). 
121 Green (2014: 3).  
122 Green (2014: 3). See Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), ICJ Rep 1955, 4. 
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In any event, there was little evidence to suggest that this group faced any serious level of 
suffering at the hands of the Ukrainian authorities.123 
 
The Broader Legal and Political Context of Crimea 
In legal terms, any assessment of events in Crimea – and indeed earlier episodes involving 
secessionist pressures within the former Soviet space – is relatively straightforward. There is 
no general right to secede within international law and although secession is not prohibited 
either, the prevailing weight of international legal opinion holds it to be invalid when (i) it 
occurs in the face of the opposition of the parent state in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances which might warrant a right of ‘remedial’ secession in accordance with the 
principles contained within the ‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations declaration; and (ii) 
it is effected by external intervention. The Crimean episode exhibits both characteristics and 
the international community has overwhelmingly declined to extend recognition to Crimea’s 
purported union with Russia. 
International law does not, however, operate in a vacuum. Its development is 
informed by the actions of states, which in turn are driven by political agendas that do not 
always conform with the dominant body of thought upon the correct application of the core 
principles of international law. Regardless of the legal relationship between statehood and 
recognition,124 on a practical level issues pertaining to legal sovereignty over territory cannot 
be divorced from the political effects of recognition. Russia’s intervention within Crimea 
may have produced a de facto situation that is irreversible, but as with other recent assertions 
                                                          
123 See Allison (2014: 1262); Marxsen (2014: 373-4). 
124 The more popular declaratory theory of recognition considers the effects of recognition to be merely 
declaratory: they evidence a pre-existing fact, namely that X satisfies the criteria of statehood, or is part of 
state Y. The constitutive theory deems a territory’s international status to be dependent upon the recognition 
of others. For discussion of both theories, see, eg., Shaw (2008: 445-454). 
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of Russian authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the international community appears 
unlikely to grant it the legitimating stamp of recognition. That secession and/or union with 
another state may be successfully effected de facto does not of itself have any legal bearing. 
This is apparent from the cases of East Timor,125 Western Sahara,126 and Northern Cyprus,127 
all of which were, or have, been occupied for considerable periods of time with no resulting 
acceptance of any change to their territorial status on the part of the international community. 
Indeed, as Almqvist has noted, “from a practical standpoint, recognition is an essential 
condition for a new state actually to exercise in an effective manner the international rights 
and obligations that are incumbent on statehood and entering into relations with other states 
and thus become a fully-fledged member of the international community.”128 Of course, 
international political responses to the Crimean episode are complicated by the fact that 
Crimea does not purport to exist as an independent state – in contrast to, for example, 
Northern Cyprus – but rather as part of another state, Russia, which must become the target 
of efforts designed to cause international isolation. Sanctions have been imposed upon Russia 
in consequence of its intervention in Ukraine,129 but the longer term effects of these remain to 
be seen and it must be borne in mind that Russia is a major international power. 
An important point which has been highlighted well by the Crimean episode is the 
inconsistency with which some states will seek to invoke norms of international law in 
support of their causes or to oppose the causes of others. It is a plausible claim that every 
instance of attempted secession comes with its own unique characteristics. Crimea is only the 
latest in a line of secessionist pressures which continue to challenge fundamental 
                                                          
125 See, eg., Ronen (1979: 54-61); Sterio (2013: 103-113). 
126 See Castellino (2000: 173-258). See, also, Cassese(1995: 214-218); Knop (2002: 110-167). 
127 See Tocci (2003). 
128 Almqvist (2013: 165, 170). See also Dugard & Raic (2006: 98), who note that “It is…difficult to maintain that 
an entity that has received recognition by none or very few states…can claim to be a State, as it cannot 
demonstrate its capacity to enter into relations with other States.” 
129 See, eg., ‘How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?’, BBC News Online, 15 September 2014 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28400218>.  
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international legal norms. The task of international law is to ensure that these norms are clear, 
consistently applied, and capable of responding to the diverse range of situations which arise 
to threaten existing state boundaries. However, states remain the principal actors within 
international law, and adherence on their part to a consistent interpretation of its norms does 
not necessarily serve to complement their geopolitical objectives. It is striking that Russia 
deployed arguments in support of its involvement in Crimea’s affairs which appear to have 
rested in part upon the existence of a right of self-determination for the population of 
Crimea,130 as well some kind of right of humanitarian intervention (or protection of nationals) 
underpinning the legitimacy of its intervention. Previously, Russia had displayed grave 
reluctance to acknowledge the existence of a right of secession for disadvantaged groups,131 
and had been critical of justifications for military intervention claimed on humanitarian 
grounds.132 It is even more remarkable that Russia claimed support for its actions in the 
‘Kosovo precedent’,133 given its condemnation of both the NATO led military intervention 
against the FRY in response to atrocities committed against the Kosovar Albanian 
population,134 as well as its outright rejection of any ground for Kosovo’s later secession 
from Serbia.135 Significantly, however, Russia had attempted to invoke notions of remedial 
secession in support of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence from Georgia,136where 
such arguments potentially furthered its cause. 
                                                          
130 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV.7144, 8; UN Doc. A/68/PV. 80, 3. 
131 See, eg., Memorandum on the maintenance of peace and stability in the CIS 1995, s.7, whereby the parties 
– including Russia and Ukraine – agree “not to support separatist movements and separatist regimes in [their 
territories]…if they arise.” 
132 For example, Russia was one of the sponsors of a draft Security Council resolution which condemned 
NATO’s intervention against the FRY in response to the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo. See UN Doc. 
S/1999/328. 
133 See Marxsen (2014: 384-388). 
134 UN Doc. S/1999/328. 
135 See Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo, of 17 February 2008 
<archive.mid.ru//bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5af46913d38ac32573f30027
b380!OpenDocument >.  
136 UN Doc. S/PV.5969, 6-9. 
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Although detailed assessments of the geopolitical dimensions to the Crimean episode 
are probably better left to scholars of international relations, an understanding of these is 
helpful in order to appreciate the factors which have driven the shift in legal rhetoric 
employed by Russia in attempts to legitimise its role in developments within Crimea. 
Politically, the Crimean issue forms merely part of a much larger regional power struggle. 
There is certainly a wider issue concerning relations between Russia and Ukraine more 
generally, conflict between Ukrainian authorities and Russian backed separatist groups 
having spread to other areas in the south-east of Ukraine, principally Donetsk and Luhansk, 
which have proclaimed their secession from the Ukraine and within which conflict continues 
to rage.  However, Russia’s interest in developments within Ukraine represents just one 
aspect of its more general concern for the future development of its relations with its 
neighbours within the former Soviet space. As noted by Allison, “Russian intervention in 
Ukraine is rooted in the dynamics of security relations and relative power.”137 However, it 
“raises acute and more immediate uncertainties about future Russian policy towards 
neighbouring states and the stability of interstate relations in Eastern Europe…”138 In the 
perspectives of several commentators, there has been a resumption of “great power rivalry” 
between Russia and the West, which is reminiscent in some respects of the Cold War.139 The 
main source of tension concerns their respective degrees of influence within Russia’s near 
abroad. Having already seen other former Soviet states drift towards integration within the 
EU – Estonia,140 Latvia and Lithuania – as well as several former communist Eastern 
European states, Russia’s foreign policy objectives include seeking to influence the external 
relations of its neighbours141 in a manner akin to the operation of the Monroe doctrine by the 
                                                          
137 Allison (2014: 1269). 
138 Allison (2014: 1256). 
139 See, eg., Trenin( 2014); March; Malyarenko & Galbraith (2013: 920-926). 
140 Estonia has an ethnic Russian population of 25 per cent according to the 2011 census, data available at 
<www.stat.ee>.  
141 See Smith & Hariri (2014: 37-38). 
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US.142 Ukraine’s apparent movement towards possible absorption within EU and NATO 
structures was clearly a source of concern for Russia.143 However, Ukraine is just one 
example within recent years of the playing out of tensions between Russia and the West, and 
developments in Georgia and Moldova in particular have also received Russia’s attention.144 
In breakaway regions within these states, “the Russian government has supported 
separatism…the key element of Putin’s strategy is to use these breakaway regions as perches 
from which to threaten the larger states that once governed them..Russian military forces 
operate in these regions and guarantee their security.”145 A deterioration in relations between 
Russia and pro-Russian regimes and western powers has already taken place and this latest 
episode threatens to harden these fault lines and potentially return the state of geopolitical 
affairs to one dominated by a new Cold War.  
 
Conclusions 
Prima facie, it is possible to draw some relatively simple conclusions from the Crimean 
episode. The prevailing weight of international legal opinion holds that Crimea’s 
incorporation within Russia is unlawful. Although secession is not expressly prohibited under 
international law, nor is there a general right of secession and each instance must be judged 
with reference to its particular circumstances. It is certainly a tall claim to suggest that the 
Crimean population has suffered some sufficiently severe oppressive treatment of the kind 
which would justify the exercise of a right of ‘remedial secession’. More important, however, 
is the widespread acceptance of the rule against recognition of territorial changes brought 
about by an unlawful act such as the use of force, as Russia’s intervention within the territory 
                                                          
142 For a definition and overview of the Monroe doctrine, see Grant (2013). 
143 See further Allison (2014: 1269-1275). 
144 See Trenin (2014: 15-18). See also Allison (2014: 1275-1277). 
145 Cullen Dunn & Bobick (2014: 406). 
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of the Ukraine was clearly understood to be. The clear international consensus upon the 
Crimean episode should be apparent from the widespread condemnation of Crimea’s 
incorporation within Russia, evidenced by resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly.  
Beyond legal pronouncements upon its validity, the process through which 
sovereignty over Crimea has effectively been removed from one state and handed to another 
highlight two fundamental difficulties inherent in the operation of international law within a 
world beset by geopolitical forces. Firstly, states are driven to act out of political or strategic 
objectives which are not always compatible with relevant norms of international law. 
Secondly, as a consequence, international legal norms find themselves stretched, 
reinterpreted, and inconsistently applied as best suits a given state’s objectives in the 
circumstances. This does not mean those norms lose their force, but it does become crucial 
that the international community unites in opposing dubious legal claims. On this occasion it 
would appear that it has done so. 
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